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The  main  objective  of  this  article  is  to  evaluate  the  effect  of  the  increase  in 
capitalization on risk appetite and to show empirical evidence for the output-financial 
institutional  risk  trade-off  in  the  Brazilian  economy.  Hence,  an  analysis  based  on 
dynamic panel data taking into account 73 banks and a vector autoregression analysis 
for the period from 2001 to 2008 is made. The findings denote that banks which adopt 
riskier  strategies  reach  higher  profitability.  Moreover,  the  results  suggest  that  the 
banking  regulation  is  an  important  instrument  for  reaching  the  balance  between  the 
economic growth and the low exposition to the risk of banking firms in markets such as 
the Brazilian. 
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Resumo 
O  principal  objetivo  deste  artigo  é  avaliar  o  efeito  do  aumento  da  capitalização  no 
apetite  pelo  risco  e  mostrar  evidências  empíricas  para  o  trade  off    que  existe  entre 
atividade econômica e risco das instituições financeiras na economia brasileira. Para 
tanto, é apresentada uma análise baseada em dados de painel dinâmico, considerando 73 
bancos, e uma análise de vetores auto-regressivos, no período 2001-2008. Os resultados 
indicam  que  os  aqueles  bancos  que  adotam  estratégias  mais  arriscadas  alcançaram 
maior rentabilidade. Além disso, os resultados sugerem que a regulação bancária é um 
instrumento importante para alcançar o equilíbrio entre o crescimento econômico e a 
baixa  exposição  ao  risco  das  empresas  de  serviços  bancários  em  mercados  como  o 
brasileiro. 
Palavras - chave: firmas bancárias, risco, lucro, produto, economia brasileira. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The organization of banking systems is subject to excessive risks because riskier 
investments tend to be more profitable. In fact, there exists a delicate conflict in the 
financial sector. On the one hand it is the task of the regulatory agencies to mitigate the 
occurrence of systemic crises, but on the other hand banks desire the highest profits for 
their stockholders and depositors although this procedure tends to be associated with 
higher risks (Estrella, 2004). 
One of the main objectives of the New Basel Capital Accord (New Accord) is an 
attempt to reduce the incentive for financial institutions to assume a high risk position. 
This accord establishes that the banks may reveal which part of their capital will be 
available for covering all sorts of risks. In brief, the New Accord brought an incentive to 
the banking sector to improve the risk management practice and it is based on three 
pillars (BIS, 2004): (i) Minimum capital for covering the credit, market, and operational 
risks - central banks must define a minimum coefficient of capital charge for the banks 
under their supervision. (ii) Banking supervision - the new framework demands that the 
regulator  of  each  country,  after  a  complete  analysis  of  the  risks,  assures  that  each 
institution has an adequate internal process for evaluation of its capital. (iii) Market 
discipline  -  the  New  Accord  establishes  recommendations  and  requirements  of 
disclosure in several areas including how each institution calculates and discloses its 
capital adequateness and methods of evaluation of risks. 
  The necessity of transparency in the information is an important factor for how 
the market discipline works. An effective transparency in the information to the private 
sector is efficacy in monitoring financial institutions.
1 It is important to note that the 
regulators, besides publishing credit ratings, have the role of leading the banks to be 
transparent in regard to their risk exposition. Through auditors, official regulators have 
the  competence  of  discovering  confidential  information  regarding  possible  problems 
that  may  be  incurred  by  financial  institutions  (Ceuster  and  Masschelein,  2003). 
Therefore the New Accord, based on the incentive of the disclosure of information, 
hopes to give conditions to the market participants to create mechanisms for mitigating 
the risk. 
Even before the subprime crisis in the USA the idea that the minimum capital 
requirements could imply an extension of the business cycle was much diffused. In a 
general  way,  academics,  practitioners,  and  policymakers  stress  the  relation  of  the 
procyclical characteristic of the capital necessary to cover the risk in credit operations 
with the business cycles.
2 Through the definition of the capital regulation associated 
with the degree of risk assumed by financial institutions, the rules proposed in the New 
Accord imply an extension or an anticipation of the business cycles. In other words, the 
business cycles are extended as a function of minimum capital required to mitigate the 
losses due to the risks assumed by the financial institutions. In recession periods the 
banks tend to constrain the credit postponing investment decisions and thus a possible 
retaking of a new economic growth phase (Allen and Saunders, 2004). 
  The New Accord defines that the capital used to support the risks of loss must 
remain invested in liquidity assets. It cannot be used in an operational mode and, as a 
consequence, it will reduce the amount of free reserves that could be used in new credit 
operations.  Therefore,  the  capital  requirement  can  imply  a  constraint  on  banking 
leverage with direct effects on profitability of sector (Kashyap and Stein, 2004). The 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Flannery (1998); Deyoung et. al. (2001); and Jagtiani et. al. (2002). 
2 See, Allen and Saunders (2004); Gordy and Howells (2004); and Kashyap and Stein (2004).   3
strategy of changing prudential regulation of liquidity (such as in the Capital Accord of 
1988) for another which defines the capital based on risk estimations can block banking 
resources available for operational activities. 
Having gone by the acute stage of the subprime crisis it is possible to identify
 
some  measures  that  should  be  part  of  the  broad  regulatory  reform  ahead:
2  (i)  the 
introduction of stricter standards of prudential regulation; (ii) the pursuit of transparency 
and  the  strengthening  of  market  discipline;  (iii)  the  intensification  of  international 
cooperation;  and  (iv)  a  greater  emphasis  on  macroeconomic  effects  from  financial 
regulation. 
With  respect  to  the  macroeconomic  effects  from  financial  regulation,  the 
proposal to replace the current model of provision of capital to cover losses of financial 
institutions,  based  on  preterit  losses,  by  a  mechanism  that  takes  into  account  the 
expected loss over the economic cycle, is gaining strength. Thus, provisions for losses 
should be calculated based on the likelihood of default associated to the economy over 
the ongoing cycle and not on the probability measured at each moment. 
The crisis triggered by the Lehman Brothers breakdown showed that the practice 
of using past data to project future losses proved to be an ineffective method, since the 
lower  market  volatility  in  the  years  preceding  the  crisis  has  provided  data  that 
underestimated risks of loss involved in the market. The limitation of models as tools to 
represent reality became clear. 
One  of  the  proposals  under  discussion  by  central  banks  to  limit  the  pro-
cyclicality of the current model of prudential regulation is to establish an additional 
requirement of regulatory capital during the growing phase of business cycles, above 
the minimum requirement of 8% set in the New Basel Accord, forming a “cushion” of 
capital. In a crisis, the additional requirement would be reduced or even eliminated, 
mitigating the effects of the crisis on the rest of the economy. 
It is a fact that the relationship between the capitalization and the willingness to 
take more risks in financial institutions is present in the literature, however the results 
are contradictory. According to Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero 
(1988) there is a positive relationship between risk and the level of capitalization of 
financial institutions. Contrary to this view,  Furlong and  Keeley (1989) and Keeley 
(1990), found evidence that a higher capitalization implies institutions which are more 
risk-averse. In other words, the literature concerning this subject did still not present a 
solution  for  this  tricky  case  and  the  subject  is  particularly  relevant  for  emerging 
economies  because  there  is  a  scarcity  of  studies.  Hence,  the  main  objective  of  this 
article is to evaluate the effect of the increase in capitalization on risk appetite and to 
show empirical evidence for the output-financial institutional risk trade-off taking into 
account 73 Brazilian banks from 2001 to 2008.  
  The justification for the analysis concerning the Brazilian case is that besides 
being one of the most important emerging economies, since the beginning of 2000, this 
economy has been marked by an improvement in macroeconomic stability which has 
contributed  to  the  development  of  financial  markets.
3  As  a  consequence  the  private 
agents have tended to migrate to riskier investments (stock market, subordinated debts, 
etc.)  with  more  profitability  (see,  de  Mendonça  and  Loures,  2009)  and  thus  this 
environment has created a “potential laboratory experiment”.  
This article is organized as follows. The second section presents the empirical 
                                                 
3 Brazil, in June of 1999, adopted an explicit inflation targeting regime which implied an improvement in 
the  transparency  and  in  the  conduction  of  the  monetary  policy  contributing  to  the  macroeconomic 
stabilization. For an analysis concerning the adoption of inflation targeting and its consequences in Brazil, 
see de Mendonça (2007).   4
analysis.  The  first  part  makes  an  empirical  analysis  from  dynamic  panel  data 
(Generalize Method of Moments) taking into account 73 banks (quarterly data spans 
from first quarter 2001 to second quarter 2008). The second part, based on a vector 
autoregression analysis, shows empirical evidence for the relation between profitability 
and banking risk as well as for output gap and banking risk in the Brazilian economy. 
Finally, section 3 concludes the article. 
 
2. Empirical evidence 
 
Failures attributed to models of risk management were pointed out recursively, 
by different market actors, as major causes that originated the crisis of the subprimes. 
The current model of financial regulation possesses procyclical characteristics where 
optimistic expectations, created from the feeling experienced amid a cycle of economic 
prosperity, diminish investors’ aversiveness to risk making them more liable to take 
risks and so transferring to the economy a condition of vulnerability (Minsky, 1982). 
The financial intermediations are intensified in periods of economic expansion 
and thus making this cycle longer. Notwithstanding, they also create an environment 
conducive to bubble formation in which, after the close of the expansionary phase, a 
downturn starts which can culminate with the collapse of the price of the assets and the 
credit rationing. 
The use of high interest rates as a tool to prevent the formation of new bubbles 
can at the same time harm all other prices of assets. According to the Tinbergen’s rule 
(Tinbergen, 1952), in order to achieve a specific objective the monetary authorities need 
to use an effective instrument, however, to reach more than one goal, they have to use 
tools that should be independent and with the same number of tasks to be accomplished 
(Mundell,  1968).  Therefore,  if  by  hypothesis  the  interest  rate  is  used  as  a  tool  of 
monetary policy to achieve price stability, the same tool should not be used to achieve 
financial stability. 
Taking into account Tinbergen’s rule and the position of the President of the 
Federal Reserve (Ben Bernanke
4), the use of regulatory and supervisory methods is the 
best way to prevent financial bubbles. Consequently, the creation of a cash cushion is a 
strategy capable of limiting the leverage of the banks in times of economic expansion. 
Central bankers from G-20 (BIS meeting on September 2009) propose to develop a 
flexible equity structure so that the requirement for a capital ratio is higher in periods of 
expansion or lower during the contraction smooth cycles working as an anti-cyclical 
tool. The minimum capital of reference shall continue to be used for calculating the 
maximum  level  of  leverage  of  the  banks,  being  8%  of  assets  weighted  by  the  risk 
(proposed by the Basel Committee). The capital cushion shall not be a new minimum 
capital, but an additional capital to be achieved in times of economic expansion that will 
be used in times of recession. 
As the cash cushion is being implemented it will be directly reflected in the 
calculation of Basel index (BI), which is the ratio of the capital of financial institutions 
and the minimum capital of reference (value of assets weighted by the corresponding 
risks), a key indicator of resistance to shocks. Focusing on the top 50 banks in Brazil (in 
terms of total assets), it is observed that the majority showed a steady decline in the 
capital ratio due to the credit crisis that followed the housing crisis which started with 
the subprime securities in the U.S. Many have got close to the limit imposed by the 
                                                 
4 See, http://www.soxfirst.com/50226711/bernanke_more_regulation_to_control_bubbles.php. 
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Central Bank of Brazil (11%) (see table 1), which implies being called on by regulatory 
authority to rebuild their assets before it becomes a problem. 
 
Table 1 
Solvency of Financial Institutions (Basel index %) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. 
The hypothesis concerned in this study is that institutions that are more capital-
intensive, with BI higher than the minimum 11%, represent institutions prone to risk and 
allowing  greater  profitability.  In  these  cases,  an  increase  in  minimum  capital 
requirements for creating a cushion of liquidity will have a damping function on the 
growth cycle in a clear anti-cyclical policy. Hence, before the loss of the effectiveness 
of the interest rate as a tool to restore the economy in recessions, the fact of reducing or 
eliminating the rate of additional regulatory capital used to build a liquidity cushion 
could eliminate the downturn. Although the simple reduction of taxation will not lead to 
an immediate increase in the level of supply of credit, since there are other exogenous 
factors competing with this variable, the improvement in the condition of solvency of 
financial institutions will improve its operational capacity in the granting of new credits. 
 
2.1. Panel data analysis 
 
Aimed to make an empirical analysis for the Brazilian case in regard to the risk 
and profitability of the financial institutions as well as in regard to the output and bank 
risks, data from the first quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of 2008 were gathered. 
Furthermore,  this  study  takes  into  consideration  information  regarding  73  Brazilian 
banking firms (see appendix – table A.1) totalizing 2190 observations for panel data. 
   2007 June  2008 July  D D D D2008/07 
5 better outcomes       
ING  27.9  51.4  + 
MORGAN STANLEY  23.0  38.9  + 
SOCIETE GENERALE  20.4  34.7  + 
WESTLB  15.6  33.8  + 
UBS PACTUAL  18.9  30.7  + 
5 worst outcomes       
BRB  14.0  11.9  - 
SAFRA  12.4  11.9  - 
BANCOOB  12.7  11.9  - 
MERCANTIL DO BRASIL  16.2  11.6  - 
FIBRA  14.1  11.5  - 
Selected outcomes       
BANCO DO BRASIL  15.8  12.5  - 
BRADESCO  18.2  14.4  - 
ITAU  18.5  17.1  - 
SANTANDER  16.3  13.6  - 
HSBC  13.2  13.1  - 
UNIBANCO  14.0  13.7  - 
CITIBANK   13.7  13.2  -   6
Hence, the following variables in logs were used in this analysis:
5 
(i) net profit (NP) – constant prices of 2001 (in billions of Reais – R$);
6 
(ii) output gap (X) – corresponds to the difference between the GDP and the potential 
output in logs (constant prices of 2001);
7 
(iii)  Basel  index  (BI)  -  capital  over  assets  measured  by  risks  –  a  proxy  of  risk  for 
financial institutions. A higher indicator reveals a higher solvency of the bank. The 
indicator is calculated through: BI=11% (Capital / regulatory capital). The Brazilian 
current  capital  obligation  is  11%  of  exposures  net  of  provision  (Basel  Committee 
defines  8%)  and  it  obeys  resolution  2682  which  prescripts  minimum  provisioning 
percentages  according  to  a  classification  criteria.  Capital  is  defined  as  the  sum  of: 
equity,  net  income,  reserves,  preferred  stocks,  subordinated  debts,  and  hybrid 
instruments.  Regulatory  capital  is  the  sum  of  risk  weighted  assets  and  other  capital 
requirements (capital for credit risk of swaps, capital for interest rate market risk, and 
capital for foreign exchange rate market risk). 
  Besides the above-mentioned variables, the following instrumental variables (in 
logs) were considered in the analysis: basic interest rate (IR); index of stock market 
activity (IBOVESPA index - IBOV); exchange rate (EX = R$/US$). 
  This study, as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), makes the estimation of 
the first difference of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel data as a manner 
of eliminating the non-observed effects in the regressions. An advantage of this method 
in relation to others (for example, Ordinary Least Squares and Feasible Generalize Least 
Square) is that it is not inconsistent with omitted variables. Furthermore, the use of 
instrument variables permits the estimation of consistent parameters even when in the 
presence of endogenous variables (Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple, 2001).  
It is important to highlight that the beginning of the period (first quarter of 2001) 
is  due  to  the  Central  Bank  of  Brazil’s  resolution  3490/2007  which  determined  the 
methodology concerning the Basel index. Aimed to analyze both relations (Basel index 
and output; and Basel index and net profit), four models regarding the size of banking 
institutions are estimated according to the following pattern (see descriptive statistics in 
table 2): 
(i) panel 1 – total assets less intermediation greater than 50 billions of Reais – total of 
11 banks;  
(ii) panel 2 - total assets less intermediation with values between 10 billions of Reais 
and 50 billions of Reais  - total of 10 banks; 
(iii) panel 3 – total assets less intermediation with values lower than 10 billions of Reais  
– total of 52 banks; and 
(iv) panel 4 – all institutions in the sample – total of 73 banks.
8  
  With  the  intention  of  correcting  the  heteroskedasticity  problem  in  the 
estimations,  the  covariance  matrices  were  estimated  by  the  White  method.  For  the 
purpose  of  verifying  the  relevance  of  the  instruments  in  the  model,  the  test  of 
overidentifying restrictions (Sargan test) is made as suggested by Arellano (2003). In 
addition, as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), two tests of first-order (m1) and 
second-order (m2) serial correlation are made.  
                                                 
5  All data is available at Central Bank of Brazil Web Site (www.bcb.gov.br).  
6 Prices were deflated by National Consumer Price Index (extended) – IPCA (official price index). As the 
net profit has negative values, its percentage variation was initially considered and after the application of 
logs was made. 
7 Due to the fact that the HP filter decomposes the time series in a cyclical component and the trend, the 
trend obtained by the HP filter can be understood as the potential output. 




     Panel 1    Panel 2    Panel 3    Panel 4 
    NP  BI    NP  BI    NP  BI    NP  BI 
 Mean    0.47  2.78    0.06  2.85    0.01  3.34    0.08  3.19 
 Median    0.32  2.75    0.03  2.84    0.00  3.22    0.01  3.01 
 Maximum    2.77  3.51    1.05  3.86    0.18  11.01    2.77  11.01 
 Minimum    -6.76  1.60    -2.37  1.95    -0.81  1.99    -6.76  1.60 
 Std. Dev.    0.72  0.23    0.20  0.25    0.03  0.76    0.33  0.70 
 Observations    330  330    300  300    1560  1560    2190  2190 
 
  It is important to stress that even with the premises of GMM, when there is no 
correlation on the first difference of endogenous regressors, testing the presence of unit 
root in the series is needed. Based on Bond, Nauges, and Windmeijer (2005) several 
tests were created for testing unit roots in panel data. This study takes into consideration 
the following tests: Levin-Lin- Chu (LLC), Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS), Fisher-ADF (ADF), 
and Fisher-PP (PP). The LLC test assumes the presence of only one unit root common 
to all cross-sections. For the other tests the existence of different unit roots in different 
cross-sections is assumed. The null hypothesis is the non-stationarity of series in all 
tests. Furthermore, the tests were applied for series in level, and the selection of lags 
was made applying Schwarz criterion. Table A.2 (see appendix) presents the results of 
tests for unit roots. As a consequence, the series NP, BI, and X were used in level, while 
the series IR and IBOV were considered in the first difference. 
  Taking into account the relation between the net profit (NP) and the Basel index 
(BI), four models regarding the size of the banking firms were estimated. The following 
equation is used in all panels:  
(1)  1 1 2 3 1 4 3 5 2 t t t t t t t NP NP BI X IR IBOV b b b b b e - - - - = + + + D + D + ,    et ~ N(0,s
2). 
Table 3 shows the outcomes of the estimations. The four panels have acceptable 
Sargan’s statistics and thus validate the instrumental variables used. In regard to the 
tests  of  first-order  (m1)  serial  correlation,  non-autocorrelation  problem  is  detected. 
However, the tests of second-order (m2) indicate that panel 4 presents this problem 
which in turn implies that the t-statistics are not reliable. 
 Table 3 
 Dynamic panel data (GMM)  
  Effect on net profit of banking firms    Effect on output gap 
  Panel 1    Panel 2    Panel 3    Panel 4    Panel 1    Panel 2    Panel 3    Panel 4 
  Coef.  t-Stat.    Coef.  t-Stat.    Coef.  t-Stat.    Coef.  t-Stat.    Coef.  t-Stat.    Coef.  t-Stat.    Coef.  t-Stat.    Coef.  t-Stat. 
NPt-1  -0.23    -2.00**    0.20  3.07***    -0.27  -82.50***    -0.19  -20.30***                         
Xt-1  -0.01     -5.41***    0.00  -0.93    0.00  23.66***    0.00  9.80***    -0.36  -31.11***    -0.31  -47.33***    -0.38  -194.26***    -0.38  -205.37*** 
BIt  -0.78     -3.12***    0.01  0.31    -0.03  -29.19***    -0.06  -6.62***                         
BIt-1                          -60.41  -12.26***    -17.56  -4.46***    -10.95  -85.03***    -15.10  -64.74*** 
D D D DIRt-2                          -33.61  -16.76***    -32.03  -33.58***    -21.51  -89.03***    -22.35  -93.00*** 
D D D DIRt-3  -0.05  -0.63    -0.09  -1.83*    0.02  26.84***    0.00  0.92                         
D D D DIBOVt-2  -0.25  -1.40    -0.01  -0.40    0.00  12.45***    0.03  8.77***                         
D D D DEXt-3                          32.19  10.97***    10.87  2.97***    26.50  561.73***    25.28  76.60*** 
N. instrum.  19    19    18    18    40    40    50    50 
Obs.  264    240    1300    1825    176    160    884    1241 
Sargan test   9.23    3.97    49.73    52.51    10.94    9.95    52.00    72.99 
(p-value)  0.16    0.55    0.37    0.74    0.14    0.13    0.32    0.14 
m1  -5.26    -6.98    -7.22    -5.10    -2.75    -4.03    -6.48    -5.73 
(p-value)  0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.01    0.00    0.00    0.00 
m2  1.50    -1.15    -1.27    2.19    -0.75    -0.49    0.33    -0.23 
(p-value)  0.13    0.25    0.20    0.03    0.46    0.62    0.74    0.81 
Note: Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, respectively. Standard error between parentheses and t-statistics bet   With  the  exception  of  the  case  of  the  medium  banks  (panel  2),  the  findings 
denote a negative relation between the current net profit and the past net profit (NPt-1). 
In other words, the profit of the previous period is not sufficient to assure high profits in 
the subsequent periods. In regard to the relation between Basel index and the banking 
profitability, once again except for the case of panel 2 (sign is positive and without 
statistical  significance),  a  negative  relation  is  observed.  Therefore,  this  result  is  in 
agreement with the idea that the exposition of the banks to higher risks tends to increase 
the profitability. 
  Such  as  in  the  analysis  for  the  relation  between  risk  and  profitability,  the 
analysis of the relation between the output gap (X) and the Basel index (BI) is made 
based on four different panels also taking into account the size of banking institutions 
using the following equation:  
(2)  1 1 2 1 3 2 4 3 t t t t t t X X BI IR EX a a a a u - - - - = + + D + D + ,   ut ~N(0,s
2). 
  According to the estimations in table 3, the tests of first-order and second-order 
serial  correlation  indicate  that  there  are  no  autocorrelation  problems  in any  models. 
Moreover, Sargan’s statistics are approved for all panels. 
The estimations in table 3 show that there is a negative relation between the 
current output gap and the output gap in the previous period. This result suggests that 
there is not a sustainable economic  growth because a decrease in the  output gap is 
followed by an increase in the output gap. In other words, the economy has a behavior 
of  “stop-and-go”.  In  a  general  way,  the  coefficients  on  the  Basel  index  indicate  a 
negative  relation  to  the  output  gap.  This  result  suggests  that  an  increase  in  the 
exposition to the risk by banking firms can contribute to a greater output gap. 
 
2.2. VAR analysis 
 
  The previous section show evidence that, independently of the size of the banks, 
the  Basel  index  and  thus  the  risk  for  financial  institutions  is  relevant  for  the 
determination of net profit of banks and the output gap. Hence, one important point is to 
ascertain the relative importance of these variables under a dynamic perspective. In this 
sense, a vector autoregression analysis (VAR) based on output gap, Basel index, and net 
profit  (average  of  73  Brazilian  banks  used  in  the  previous  section  –  see  table  A.1 
appendix) is made. It is important to note that the VAR allows analyzing the dynamic 
impact of random disturbances on the system of variables. In particular, the analysis 
through impulse-response is attractive because it permits the evaluation of the response 
of BI caused by shocks (or innovations) provoked by residual variables over time (Sims, 
1980).  
Before  the  VAR  estimation,  the  unit-root  tests  (Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  – 
ADF and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin - KPSS) were made. Both tests indicate 
the  series  are  non-stationary  in  level.  On  the  other  hand,  first  difference  series  are 
stationary, and thus all series in this analysis are I(1) (see table A.3 - appendix). As a 
consequence,  the  use  of  first  difference  of  series  in  VAR  would  be  adequate. 
Furthermore, with the objective of defining the VAR order, Akaike (AIC), Schwarz 
(SC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQ) criteria are used. The three criteria indicate that the lag 
order for VARs is 3 (see table A.6 - appendix).  
It is important to note that the use of first difference series can imply a loss of 
relation in the long run among series.  Hence, it is necessary to evaluate if  a linear 
combination among series is stationary even if individually series are nonstationary. In 
other words, it is essential to verify if the series are cointegrated because, in this case, it 
is recommendable to use a Vector Error Correction (VEC) in the estimations. With the   10
intention of verifying the cointegration of variables of the VAR, the cointegration test 
proposed  by  Johansen  (1991,  LR  test  statistic),  based  on  the  significance  of  the 
estimated  eigenvalues  was  performed.  The  inclusion  of  the  intercept  and  trend  was 
defined based on Pantula principle (see Harris, 1995). The result present in table A.4 
(see  appendix)  denotes  for  the  set  of  series  –  X,  BI,  and  NP  -  that  the  adequate 
specification has intercept in the cointegrating vector. The cointegration test, indicates 
that the trace statistic rejects the non-cointegration hypothesis at the 5% significance 
level and reveals that there exists 1 cointegrating equation (see table A.5 - appendix). 
Therefore,  the  cointegration  tests  indicate  that  there  is  a  long-term  equilibrium 
relationship among the variables under analysis. 
In a general way, it is usual in VAR estimations to apply the “orthogonality 
assumption” and thus the result may depend on the ordering of variables (Lutkenpohl, 
1991). Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) developed the 
idea  of  the  generalized  impulse  response  function  as  a  manner  of  eliminating  the 
problem of the ordering of variables. The main argument is that the generalized impulse 
responses are invariant to any re-ordering of the variables in the VAR (or VEC). Hence, 
there are two potential advantages with this method (Ewing, 2003): (i) the generalized 
impulse response function provides more robust results than the orthogonalized method; 
and  (ii)  due  to  the  fact  that  orthogonality  is  not  imposed,  the  generalized  impulse 
response function allows for meaningful interpretation of the initial impact response of 
each variable to shocks on any of the other variables. 
With the objective of giving robustness to the results from the VEC estimated, 
autocorrelation  (LM),  normality  (Jarque-Bera),  and  stability  (AR  roots)  tests  were 
performed (see tables A.7, A.8, and figure A.1). The results indicate that there is no 
serial correlation, the residuals are normal, and the VEC is stable. Hence, the impulse-
response analysis from this VEC is valid. 
  Figure 1 shows the results of the generalized impulse-response functions and are 
plotted out to the 10th quarters. In regard to responses of BI, it is observed that the 
effect of a shock on output gap is negligible and it is eliminated in the next period. In a 
different way, the innovations on BI and X transmitted to BI cannot be neglected. The 
results suggest a persistence of BI. In other words, when the Basel index is increased by 
banks this behavior tends to remain unchanged. An interesting implication is the effect 
caused by a shock on output gap. An increase in economic activity contributes to a 
decrease in Basel index over time. Therefore, under this environment the capital over 
assets measured by risks becomes lower. 
Concerning the responses of output gap, it is possible to see that the effects are 
not durable. The effect transmitted by a shock on net profit of banks is not significant 
for a response by the output gap. On the other hand, the effects of an innovation on 
itself and on Basel index indicate a short-term effect. The outcome regarding the output 
gap is in consonance with the presence of the business cycle. Moreover, as observed by 
Allen and Saunders (2004), a positive shock on Basel index (an increase in the bank’s 
risk aversion), although the effect is limited to the first 3 quarters, can imply a credit 
constraint which promotes a fall in economic activity. 
  The responses of net profit of banks are relevant for the three cases and denote 
that the effects caused by the transmission of shocks are not eliminated over 10 quarters. 
The graph regarding the response to an innovation on the net profit reveals that there 
exists  a  persistence  of  the  positive  effect.  It  is  also  observed  that  an  expansion  in 
economic activity (increase in the output gap) promotes an increase in the net profit of 
banks which is not eliminated. A possible justification for this result is that there exists 
an increase in the public’s demand for credit and the risk of nonpayment decreases   11
considerably. Furthermore, a very interesting result is observed from the innovation on 
Basel index transmitted to the net profit of banks. The graph shows that a positive shock 
on Basel index decreases the net profit of banks over time. In other words, the result 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of NP to NP





The empirical evidence suggests that banks which adopt riskier strategies reach 
higher profitability. Moreover, the observation of a positive relation between output gap 
and the banking risk in the Brazilian economy indicates the presence of a possible trade-
off between bank risk and output. In other words, the findings are aligned with works 
that identified a positive relationship between levels of capitalization and risk, which 
could suggest the ineffectiveness of this measure as a strategy to make the financial   12
system better prepared to face new crises. 
In the search for higher profits the banks are subject to a greater exposition to 
risk. Hence, due to a lower severity in the concession of credit, the volume of credit 
available tends to increase in the market. Furthermore, the strategy of reducing the rate 
of application of capital in periods of recession may contribute to smooth cycles. The 
idea is that there is an increase in the liquidity of the economy that is favorable to new 
investments and thus a stimulus to the economic growth is created. 
It is a fact that, in the short term, an increase in the risk exposition of financial 
institutions can be considered a positive factor, however high risk expositions foster the 
possibility  of  new  financial  crisis.  Therefore  the  economic  growth  due  to  a  higher 
exposition of banking firms to risk may be considered jeopardized. In other words, there 
exists  a  trade-off  between  bank  risk  and  output.  Hence,  banking  regulation  is  an 
important instrument for reaching the balance between the economic growth and the 
low exposition to the risk of banking firms in markets such as the Brazilian. 
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Table A.1 
 Classification of banking firms 
PANEL 1  PANEL 2  PANEL 3 
BANCO DO BRASIL  CITIBANK  BMG  IBIBANK  GE CAPITAL  RENDIMENTO  RENNER 
ITAU  BNP PARIBAS  SS  BANCOOB  BANPARA  GUANABARA  OPPORTUNITY 
BRADESCO  BANRISUL  BANESTES  SOCIETE 
GENERALE 
INDUSTRIAL 
DO BRASIL  MATONE  BCOMURUGUAI 
CAIXA ECONÔMICA 
FEDERAL  PACTUAL  BASA  BANSICREDI  BGN  INTERCAP  LA PROVINCIA 
ABN ANRO  BNB  DAYCOVAL  CLASSICO  BONSUCESSO  CARGILL  FICSA 
UNIBANCO  ALFA  MERCANTIL 
DO BRASIL 
BARCLAYS 
GALICIA  TRIANGULO  BEPI  BANCNACION 
SANTANDER  BBM  ABC-BRASIL  ING  FATOR  RIBEIRAO 
PRETO  POTTENCIAL 
HSBC  DEUTSH  BESC  SCHAHIN  MODAL  GERDAU  LA REPUBLICA 
VOTORONTIM  BIC  SOFISA  INDUSVAL  SMBC  CREDIBEL   
SAFRA  FIBRA  RABOBANK  RURAL  PROSPER  LUSO 
BRASILEIRO   
NOSSA CAIXA    PINE  BANESE  VR  CEDULA     15
Table A.2 
Panel unit roots tests 
         Constant  Constant and trend  Without constant or trend 











Estat.  2.1741  -5.1005  62.2744  315.2690  4.8566  -2.7399  32.8760  276.6020  -10.6069  118.5480  469.0540 
Prob.  0.9851  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0031  0.0636  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
NP 
Estat.  3.1297  -1.3223  61.0121  185.2600  5.4209  -5.5162  75.3689  521.9630  2.1958  7.1684  95.7602 
Prob.  0.9991  0.0930  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.9859  0.9988  0.0000 
BI 
Estat.  -4.9713  -4.8155  66.7853  65.4828  -1.0402  -1.2939  48.2990  51.5849  -0.2544  11.2137  11.2847 
Prob.  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.1491  0.0978  0.0010  0.0004  0.3996  0.9716  0.9704 
IR 
Estat.  -2.2945  -0.9165  20.9133  2.7898  -3.3724  -3.8555  48.7356  21.6684  -2.1641  18.8186  18.0831 
Prob.  0.0109  0.1797  0.5261  1.0000  0.0004  0.0001  0.0009  0.4798  0.0152  0.6565  0.7010 
D(IR) 
Estat.  -6.6968  -5.1720  63.3453  46.6178  -5.7905  -2.6644  35.9339  17.6340  -9.5422  117.0320  103.7330 
Prob.  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0016  0.0000  0.0039  0.0309  0.7275  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
IBOV 
Estat.  2.8147  6.0743  0.8819  0.5976  -3.5821  -4.0373  49.1761  55.7176  6.1477  0.3656  0.2080 
Prob.  0.9976  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.0002  0.0000  0.0008  0.0001  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
D(IBOV) 
Estat.  -16.6605  -14.7812  202.6270  202.7240  -15.2370  -13.6655  168.4870  171.3880  -16.0906  241.6630  242.1820 
Prob.  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
EX 
Estat.  6.2807  5.3523  0.8530  3.3696  -7.4440  -2.6003  34.1391  125.3300  -1.8737  17.0981  16.9210 
Prob.  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0047  0.0475  0.0000  0.0305  0.7579  0.7677 
D(EX) 
Estat.  -6.8698  -6.4438  80.1962  91.4890  -8.5956  -8.8393  105.6190  129.6220  -11.8847  159.5560  154.2690 











Estat.  2.0729  -4.8632  56.6131  286.6080  4.6306  -2.6124  29.8873  251.4570  -10.1133  107.7710  426.4130 
Prob.  0.9809  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0045  0.0717  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
NP 
Estat.  -1.3898  -1.6554  61.5140  121.6280  0.5699  -3.0286  71.5796  241.2770  -10.8914  308.0640  86.1174 
Prob.  0.0823  0.0489  0.0000  0.0000  0.7156  0.0012  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
BI 
Estat.  -2.0892  -2.9490  42.2414  58.9064  -4.9172  -5.1924  60.4613  57.7533  -1.0014  14.9859  30.7370 
Prob.  0.0183  0.0016  0.0026  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.1583  0.7772  0.0588 
IR 
Estat.  -2.1877  -0.8739  19.0121  2.5362  -3.2155  -3.6760  44.3051  19.6985  -2.0634  17.1078  16.4392 
Prob.  0.0143  0.1911  0.5210  1.0000  0.0007  0.0001  0.0014  0.4769  0.0195  0.6460  0.6890 
D(IR) 
Estat.  -6.3852  -4.9313  57.5866  42.3798  -5.5211  -2.5404  32.6672  16.0309  -9.0981  106.3930  94.3026 
Prob.  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0025  0.0000  0.0055  0.0367  0.7147  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000   16
IBOV 
Estat.  2.6837  5.7916  0.8017  0.5432  -3.4154  -3.8494  44.7056  50.6523  5.8616  0.3324  0.1891 
Prob.  0.9964  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.0003  0.0001  0.0012  0.0002  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
D(IBOV) 
Estat.  -15.8851  -14.0933  184.2070  184.2940  -14.5279  -13.0295  153.1700  155.8080  -15.3418  219.6940  220.1650 
Prob.  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
EX 
Estat.  5.9884  5.1032  0.7754  3.0632  -7.0976  -2.4793  31.0356  113.9360  -1.7865  15.5437  15.3828 
Prob.  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0066  0.0547  0.0000  0.0370  0.7445  0.7541 
D(EX) 
Estat.  -6.5501  -6.1439  72.9057  83.1718  -8.1956  -8.4279  96.0177  117.8380  -11.3316  145.0510  140.2440 











Estat.  4.7269  -11.0897  294.3880  1490.3600  10.5593  -5.9572  155.4140  1307.5700  -23.0618  560.4100  2217.3500 
Prob.  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0008  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
NP 
Estat.  -4.2988  -6.3868  299.4840  627.5580  -4.4547  -6.6776  268.5990  1090.0600  -2.5820  296.6330  470.0570 
Prob.  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0049  0.0000  0.0000 
BI 
Estat.  -6.1230  -7.2134  243.1510  219.6760  -6.4646  -7.1043  233.6590  230.7260  -2.2533  92.0600  93.9382 
Prob.  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0121  0.7925  0.7501 
IR 
Estat.  -4.9887  -1.9928  98.8628  13.1883  -7.3324  -8.3826  230.3870  102.4320  -4.7053  88.9608  85.4838 
Prob.  0.0000  0.0231  0.6239  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.5251  0.0000  0.8534  0.9069 
D(IR) 
Estat.  -14.5605  -11.2451  299.4500  220.3750  -12.5900  -5.7931  169.8690  83.3607  -20.7468  553.2430  490.3740 
Prob.  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.9321  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
IBOV 
Estat.  6.1197  13.2069  4.1688  2.8248  -7.7884  -8.7780  232.4690  263.3920  13.3665  1.7283  0.9832 
Prob.  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
D(IBOV) 
Estat.  -36.2237  -32.1377  957.8750  958.3300  -33.1288  -29.7119  796.4820  810.2000  -34.9846  1142.4100  1144.8600 
Prob.  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
EX 
Estat.  13.6557  11.6371  4.0323  15.9288  -16.1850  -5.6536  161.3850  592.4680  -4.0739  80.8275  79.9904 
Prob.  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0003  0.0000  0.0000  0.9552  0.9613 
D(EX) 
Estat.  -14.9364  -14.0102  379.1090  432.4930  -18.6888  -19.2186  499.2920  612.7580  -25.8400  754.2640  729.2700 









  X 
Estat.  5.5768  -13.1608  414.0190  2098.7500  12.5279  -7.0739  218.5790  1874.9400  -27.3229  787.0100  3124.9700 
Prob.  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
NP 
Estat.  -2.6844  -6.4938  422.0100  934.4470  -1.1838  -8.9376  415.5480  1853.2900  -6.1228  611.8650  651.9350 
Prob.  0.0036  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.1182  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
BI  Estat.  -7.8641  -9.0193  351.4010  343.2820  -7.7110  -8.4484  343.4320  340.8760  -2.3195  118.1930  136.4430   17
Prob.  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0102  0.9558  0.7029 
IR 
Estat.  -5.7351  -2.2154  137.2150  19.7740  -8.5222  -9.7327  319.6470  145.6570  -5.5940  125.3690  119.4800 
Prob.  0.0000  0.0134  0.6864  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.4924  0.0000  0.8906  0.9471 
D(IR) 
Estat.  -17.4582  -13.6339  431.8200  321.9720  -14.9177  -7.0733  244.1220  129.8210  -24.8362  790.1720  702.8270 
Prob.  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.8276  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
IBOV 
Estat.  7.2509  15.6480  5.8523  3.9656  -9.2280  -10.4006  326.3510  369.7620  15.8371  2.4263  1.3803 
Prob.  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
D(IBOV) 
Estat.  -42.9193  -38.0780  1344.7100  1345.3500  -39.2523  -35.2038  1118.1400  1137.4000  -41.4512  1603.7600  1607.2100 
Prob.  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
EX 
Estat.  16.1799  13.7881  5.6607  22.3616  -19.1767  -6.6986  226.5600  831.7330  -4.8270  113.4690  112.2940 
Prob.  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.9787  0.9825 
D(EX) 
Estat.  -17.6973  -16.5998  532.2110  607.1540  -22.1433  -22.7710  700.9290  860.2180  -30.6162  1058.8700  1023.7800 
Prob.  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Note: (*) The final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion. LLC – Levin-Lin-Chu test – common root processes – H0: a = 0.IPS – Im-Pesaran-Shin 
test– individual root processes – H0: a = 0 (for each i). ADF – Fisher-ADF test – individual root processes – H0: a = 0 (for each i). PP – Fisher-PP test – 
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Table A.3 
Unit root tests (ADF and KPSS) 



















BI    8  -2.9100  -4.4679  -3.6450  4  0.1787  0.1190  0.1460 
D(BI)    5  -4.5098  -4.4163  -3.6220  0  0.0268  0.1190  0.1460 
X    4  -2.7574  -4.3743  -3.6032  7  0.1540  0.1190  0.1460 
D(X)    4  -4.3760  -4.3943  -3.6122  5  0.1133  0.1190  0.1460 
NP    4  -3.1311  -4.3743  -3.6032  9  0.2643  0.1190  0.1460 
D(NP)    2  -5.1408  -4.3561  -3.5950  6  0.0884  0.1190  0.1460 
Note: Series BI and X are in logs. 
ADF test – the final choice of 
lag was made based on Schwarz 
criterion (SC). KPSS test – lag 
is the lag truncation chosen for 
the Bartlett kernel. 
 
Table A.4 
Number of Cointegrating Relations by Model (BI, X, NP) 
Data Trend:  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 
Test Type  No Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept 
  No Trend  No Trend  No Trend  Trend  Trend 
Trace  1  1  1  1  1 
Max-Eig  1  1  1  1  1 
Note: Selected (0.05 level) - critical values based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) 
Rank or  No Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept 
No. of CEs  No Trend  No Trend  No Trend  Trend  Trend 
0   3.2278   3.2278   3.2762   3.2762   3.1321 
1   2.9392   1.8371    1.8222*   1.8942   1.8512 
2   3.1888   2.0656   2.0484   2.0575   1.9631 
3   3.6217   2.4568   2.4568   2.3651   2.3651 
Note: Akaike Information Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns) 





Johansen’s Cointegration Test (BI, X, NP) 
Hypothesized No. 
of CE(s)  Eigenvalue  Trace Statistic 
Critical Value 
(0.05)  Prob.** 
None *   0.8502   58.1223   29.7971   0.0000 
At most 1   0.1960   6.8651   15.4947   0.5934 
At most 2   0.0355   0.9750   3.8415   0.3234 
Note:  (*)  denotes  rejection  of  H0  at  the  5%  significance  level.  (**)  MacKinnon-Haug-
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Table A.6 
VAR lag order selection criteria 
Lag  AIC  SC  HQ 
0   6.3385   6.4837   6.3803 
1   5.5554   6.1361   5.7226 
2   2.9295   3.9456   3.2221 
3    1.9731*    3.4247*    2.3911* 
4   2.2375   4.1246   2.7809 
Note: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 
 
Table A.7 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Lag  LM-Stat  Prob 
1   4.3927   0.8837 
2   4.4487   0.8795 
3   4.1468   0.9015 
4   21.626   0.0101 
5   9.4771   0.3945 
6   3.5325   0.9394 
Note: Probs from chi-square with 9df. 
 
Table A.8 
VAR Residual Normality Tests 
Component  Jarque-Bera  df  Prob 
X   6.0211  2   0.0493 
BI   3.4403  2   0.1790 
NP   1.1785  2   0.5547 
Joint   22.6894  25   0.5957 
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Note: VEC specification imposes 2 unit roots. 